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3
IX THFJ

SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
I<:EXXI~~TH

\\. . HITE,
..:ippellaut.
YS.

l<:r~NXETH

J. PIXXEY, doing business a~ the PIXXEY BE\:""ERAGE
CO:JIP _,__~XI'", and _._-\_. C. NESLEN,

No. 6218

Respondents.

_._\ ppeal fron1 the Third Judicial District Court,
lionorahle ~[. J. Bronson, Judge.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.
ST1\TE~fENT

OF TETE CASE

rrhis is an appeal froin a judgment made and entered
in the ~~hird Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
Count~', on .April 21, 1939, in favor of Appellee and
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against Appellant, and from an order made and entered
by the said Court on June 30, 1939, denying appellant's
motion for a new trial. (Transcript 79 and 84, Abstract
58, 61, 62).
Appellant brought this action against the defendants
to recover for personal injuries. On December 23, 1938
at about 4:30p.m., appellant's Chevrolet panel truck was
parked on the west side of Highland Drive, Salt Lake
City, Utah, at a point opposite 2333 South.

The truck

was facing south and was parallel to and 'vithin six or
eight inches of the west curb.

Appellant was standing

behind and a little to the west of the center of the truck
!1nd vvas in the act of handing some flovvers to a customer,
the witness l\f axwell, who was standing slightly to the
north and east of appellant, when a wheel with considerable force struck appellant on the left leg injuring him.
(Transcript 95-99 and 141-144, Abstract 18, 19). The
\vitnes~, ~fax\vell, testified that the \vheel buzzed past hi~
and he sa\v it strike appellant on the leg and bounce, con1ing to rest on the curb. (Transeript 14-1-144, Abstract 18,
19.) Just as he was hit, appellant saw a fast-moving,
staked-hod:T truck 'vith barrels on the back going north~
having passed the point on the ~treet 'vhere appellant
\\Tas hit. Appellant picked up the \vheel and overtook the
truck \vhich \vas parked ~n front of an inn at about 2160
South Highland Drive. Appellant noticed a hand-truck
or dolly \vith a 1nissing 'vheel hanging on thP side of the
truek. On this hand-truck \\Tas a \vheel si1nilar to the
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"7'heel \vhich had
\\~heel

~truck

appellant.

Appellant gave the

to thP driYPr of the truck, the defendant N eslen,

infor1ning hin1 that the \Yheel had struck appellant. (Transcript 100-10-L _._-\bstraet
'Ya~

1:1~

16).

The defendant N eslen

driYing the truck for the defendant Kenneth J.

l)inney on Decen1ber
pa~~Pd

:2:1~ 1~l88

and in the late afternoon

the point on Highland Drive \Vhere the appellant

"·a~

injured, and \Ya~ parked at the Dixie lunch stand in
~ugar Hou~e \\·hen appellant delivered to hiin the \\·heel.
(Transcript 217 -22-l-, .L.\bstraet 82-:1;)). The defendant
X e~len testified that there \\·as a \\·hePl Ini~sing fron1 the
hand-truck and that the \vheel the plaintiff handed hi1n
looked like one of the "·heels off his hand-truck and he \Vas
surprised to find plaintiff had it. ( Transeript 238, Ab~traet :~3). The \\·itness Butter\vorth testified that he \vas
delivering mail to the Dixie Lunch -vvhen the appellant
\vith -vvhom he \vas acquainted arrived there -vvith the \vheel
in his hand and that the hand-truck \\'"ith a -vvheel1nissing
from it \Vas hanging on the side of the truck just behind
the <lriYer 's cab. (Transcript 151-154, Abstract 19-21).
lTpon examing the hand-truck produced in court h~v the
defendants, the -vvitness Butterworth testified that the
w·heels on it -vvere different fron1 the wheel \vhich \Vas on
the hand-truck on the da~· of the injury and the \vheel
\'{hich struek appellant. The \vheel which struck appellant \\'a::-: larg(~r. the axle \Vas larger, the tire covering on
the \\·heel \vhieh struck appellant \vas \vorn and the iron
~how'erl

through in a fe\v spots.

.. \h~trart 29).

(Transcript 200, 201,

The appellant testified that the \vheels on
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the hand-truck produced in court were different from the
wheel which had struck him and he pointed qut the same
differences as did the witness Butterworth, together with
the additional difference that there was a different
method of greasing the two whe~ls. (Transcript 207, Abstract 31).

II.

SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR

Appellant on this appeal has made 11 assignments of
error which may be summarized as follows:
1. The trial court should have instructed the jury
that the defendants were guilty of negligence as a matter
of law. (Assignments of Error 1, 4, 7, 8, and 9. Abs.
66, 67).

2. The trial court should not have submitted the
issue of contributory negligence to the jury. (Assignments of Error 2, 5, 6, 9, and 11. Abs. 66-68).
3. The instructions given by the trial court on contributory negligence were not confined to the contributory negligence alleged in defendants' answer, and having
submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury
the trial court should have given appellant's requested
instruction No.4. (Assigninents of Error 3, 6, 9, and 11.
Abs. 66-68).
4. The court usurped the prerogative of the jury in
assun1ing as true evidence about which there vvas a substantial dispute. ( Assignn1ent of Error 10. Abs. 68).
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III. BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT

1.

The doctrine of res ipsa kJqfiJJitur applied :to the -ease
and the appellant

~vas

entitled to a peremptory instruc-

tion that the defendants 'lvere negligent as a matter of
law.
PoiNT 2.

There be-ing no eridence .supporting the defense of
contributory negligenc'e, .that

,is~c~te

should 111ot

hrav~e

been

sub1nitted to the jury.
PorNT.3.

The trial cottrt erred ·in YJ'I!.Ot limiting its instructions
on contributory negligence to that contributory negligence
:which uJas alleged in -bhe ·answer.
PDINT

4.

;Havmg submitte-d cthe issue ~nf 'Contributory negli·g~en;c·e -tv the ju·ry the ~court should ,·h.av:e g~iven .appellant's
cre.quested ·instruction No. 4, ~:to ~the ;.effect :-that ·appellant .•being shield.ed by ··his -truck ~parked pa·rallel ~to
·the curb ~was under >no· dtttJy to maintain a ·constant. lookout and his fail~t're. to 1naintain a -:lookrout under ·those
circu,rnstanc-es may ·ndt ·be considered as ·contributory
negligence.
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PoiNT

5.

That the defendants would not be liable if the defect
in their equipment was simply unknown to them was a
mis-stateme~t of the law.
PoiNT

6.

The trial court usurped the prerogative of the jury
in assuming as true evidence about which there was a substantial dispute.
PoiNT

7.

That the trial court should have granted appellant's
motion for a new trial.
I\T.

ARGU~1:ENT
POINT

1.

The doctri,ne of res ipsa loquitur applied to the case
and the appellant tvas entitled to a peremptory instruction
that the defendants were negligent as a nzatter of law.
There is a decided split in the authorities as to whether
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur raises a presumption of
negligence or merely authorizes the jury to find negligence
from the fact of the occurrence. The Supren1e Court of
Utah has committed itself to the view that \vhen a thing
-vvhich causes injury is shown to be under the exclusive
control of the defendant, and the injury i~ such as, in thP
ordinary course of things, dot~:-; not oernr if the one haY-
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ing such control uses proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that the injury
aro~e fro1n the defendant's \Yant of care. That view is
expressed in ,,~illian1son v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry. Co., 52
lTtah 8-±, 17:2 Pac. 680, and Zoccolillo v. Oregon Short Line
R.. Co .. ji1 lTtah 39. 177 Pac. 201. In the latter case, the
Court said. ho\vever. at page 63-64:
.. It (negligence) 1nay be inferred fron1 such
occurrence, and ''"here no explanation is offered
in such case the inference 1nny he so strong as not
only to justify. but to e(nnpel, a i1nding of negligence. \Yhich is the ultin1ate fact to he established.',
,,,.. e believe that the ca~e of Furkovich v. Binghan1
Coal & Lun1ber Co., -1-:5 Utah 89, 14::3 Pac. 121, supports
the principle for \\-hieh \\-e are here contending. In that
ease the plaintiff \Yas struck by large piece of eoal \Yhich
rolled do\vn the n1ountainside. The plaintiff's cornpanion
\Vent up the trail to the top of the n1ountatin \\"here tlH_;
coal \\Tas heing unloaded and found a n1an unloading conl
out of a vvagon and a pile of coal \vas located on the
1nountainside \vithin a couple of feet fron1 the brink of
the steep incline of the 1nountain. In that case the trial
court had instructed the jury as follows :
''Yon are instructed that if you should find
fron1 a preponderance of the evidence that the
piece of coal vvhich rolled do\vn the mountain side
and struck the plaintiff vvas a part of the coal being
unloaded by the defendant at the tin1e and place
alleged in plaintiff's co1nplaint, the rolling of such
piece of coal do,vn the steep rnoun ta tin side raises
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a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant, and unless you should find from all the
evidence in the case that such presumption is overcome, you should find for the plaintiff.''
The foregoing insruction was duly excepted to, but
the Supreme Court upheld the instruction saying:
''If what we have said respecting the inference or presumption of negligence is correct, then
it follows that the court did not err in giving the
charge excepted to.''
The record in the case at bar is entirely bereft of any
explanation whatever as to how the wheel flew from the
hand-truck and struck the plaintiff. The defendant
Neslen testified on cross-examination that he had never
taken out the cotter key nor had he made any other inspection of the hand-truck, except greasing it, although the
hand-truck had been used over a year (Transcript 240,
Abstract 35, 36).
1 Shearrnan & Redfield on Negligence, Gth Ed., 130 :
''Whether it (res ipsa loquitur) "rill warrant a
peremptory instruction is to be determined as in
other cases by the ans,ver to the question, is there
any other reasonable view of the case~''
That the circumstances may warrant a perernptory
instruction is indicated by the foregoing quotation. The
case of Byrne v. Boadle, 2 Hurlst. & C. 722, 159 Eng.
Reports 299 applies the rule applicable to the case at bar.
In that case plaintiff was 'valking in a public street past
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the defendant•s shop "\vhen a barrel of flour fell upon him
from a "\vindovv above the shop:
"''re are all of opinion that the rule n1ust be
absolute to enter the verdict for the plaintiff. The
learned counsel \vas quite right in saying that
there are n1any accidents from which no presumption of negligence can arise, but I think it would be
vvrong to la~~ dow'n as a rule that in no case can a
pre~tunption of negligence arise froin the fact of
the accident. Suppose in this case the barrel harl
rolled out of the "\Varehouse and fallen on the plaintiff. Ho,veyer could he possibl:v assert from what
cause it occurred J? It is the duty of persons vvho
keep barrels in a \Yarehouse to take care that they
do not roll out. and I think that such a case vvould,
heyonrl all doubt, afford prima facie evidence of
negligence. __._-\ barrel could not roll out of a vvarehouse \Yithout some negligence, and to say· that a
plaintiff who is injured by it must call vvitness(~S
from the \Yarehouse to prove negligence seerlls to
n1e preposterous. So in the building or repairing
of a house, or putting pots on the chin1neys, if a
person passing along the road is injured hy S(Hl1ething falling upon him, I think the accident alone
\Vould he prin1a facie evidence of negligence. Or
if an article calculated to cause darnage is put in a
'vrong place and does mischief, I think that those
vvhose duty it was to put it in the right place are
prima facie responsible, and if there is any state of
facts to rebut the presumption of negligence, they
must prove the1n. ''
To the same effect is the case of Cincinnati Traction
Co. v. _1\.nna Holzenkamp, 7-1- Ohio St. 379, 78 N. E. 529.
The plaintiff \vas struck by the falling of a trolley pole
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from an electric car. The Supreme Court of Ohio held
that the trial court "was warranted in taking judicial
notice of the fact, as it did, that such a thing as the breaking of the trolley pole and the falling of the trolley with
a portion of the pole does not happen in the ordinary
course of events, unless there was some negligence either
in its construction or in the management of it; and, this
being so the court very properly charged the jury that
the plaintiff in the absence of any evidence tending to
rebut the presumption of negligence, was entitled to recover for her injuries.''
The following cases follow the same principle:
Hogan v. Manhattan Ry. Co., Court of Appeals of
New York, 43 N. E. 403;
Heidt v. People's Motorbus Co. of St. Louis
(Mo.), 9 S. W. 2d 650;
Crozier v. Hawkeye Stages, Inc., et al. (Ia.) 228
N. W. 320;
1f.umma v. Easton & A. R. Co. et al. (New Jersey)
65 Atl. 208;
Francisco v. Circle Tours Sight-Seeing Co. (Ore.),
265 Pac. 801 ;
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Rowland (Ky.), 214
S. W. 910;
State v. Emerson & Morgan Coal Co.
Atl. 601;

(~Td.),

133

Gates v. Crane Co. (Conn.), 139 Atl. 782;
Feeney v. New York Waist House (Conn.), 136
Atl. 554.
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PoiNT

2.

There being no evidence supporting the defense of
contribu,fory negligence, that issue should not have been
sub1nitted to the jury.
The record discloses the follo,ving undisputed facts:
. .\.t the tin1e of the injury the appellant was shielded behind his CheYrolet ·panel truck in the act of handing
flo\vers to the \Yitness )[ax\vell. ~faxwell was standing
between hin1 and the balance of the street. The truck
\Yas parked parallel to and vvithin a fevv inches of the
curb on the \Yest side of the street. Cars proceeding in
a northerly direction \vould have to get over on the wrong
~ide of the street in order to present the danger of injury to hin1, and that "Tas the direction in which the
truck driven by the defendant Neslen was traveling. Furthermore, from the testimony of the witness l\rfaxwell,
who said that the "wheel buzzed past me," it would be
reasonable to conclude that if the appellant could have
~een the \vheel before it struck hi1n, he \vould not have
been able to dodge it. It could not be reasonably contended that the appellant could have anticipated that
the \Vheel would fly off the hand-truck, as he never had
an opportunity or a duty to inspect the hand-truck.
It is universally held that although the question of
contributory negligence is generally for the jury, if the
evidence is undisputed and there is no fact showing contributory negligence or from \vhich such negligence can
be reasonably inferred, then it is the positive duty of the
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court to eliminate that issue fro1n the consideration of
the jury. Some tangible evidence must be introduced before the question can be left to the jury; the burden of
proving the defense cannot be sustained by silence. The
very purpose of instructions is to enable the jury to
better understand their duty and to prevent them from
arriving at erroneous and false conclusions. In submitting an issue to the jury upon which there is
no evidence, that purpose is thwarted.
This point has been passed upon by this Court many
times. We submit that the case of Atwood v. Utah Light
& Ry. Co., 44 Utah 366, 140 Pac. 137, is directly in point.
In holding the plaintiff free from contributory negligence
as a matter of law, the Court said:
"The facts here are not disputed, at least not
with regard to respondent's conduct. Now what
was there in her conduct from which a jury or
anybody else would· be justified to find that anything she did or ·omitted to do was the proxi1nate
~ause of or directly contributed to, the accident
and consequent injury~ ... \V e can see no reason·
whatever why, under the undisputed evidence, respondent's conduct should likewise have been submitted to the jury ... As a n1atter of course, in
cases like the one at bar, the trial courts should
ordinarily submit the question of negligence to
the jury; and such should be done in all cases when
there is any substantial evidence upon \¥hich a
finding of negligence can be based. \\ThPre, ho\¥ever, as here, there is no evidence, the question
must be deter1nined as ·one of lavv and not of
fact."
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In the foregoing case the trial court had charged the
jury as follo,vs: '~You are instructed that there is no
evidence in this case of any negligence on the part of
the plaintiff.'' It 'vas held by this Court that no error
\Yas co1n1nitted by the court in so charging the jury.
To the san1e effect is the case of Maybee v. ~[aybee,
79 l:tah 383, 11 Pac. 2d 973; Parks v. Tillis (\\T. \Tn \, 1 G/~_

S. E.

7~17.

Confir1ning our position is the case of l\Ienafee v.
Jionongahela Ry. Co. (\\T. \Ta.), 148 S. E. 109. In that
case plaintiff 'vas injured by a lump of coal which fell
from a 1noving train "\vhen the driving brakes were
applied jarrnning the train. Quoting fron1 the opinion:
"\\... e conclude fron1 the 'vhole record that
there vvas no occasion to submit to the jury the
question of contributory negligence, because there
was no appreciable basis on which to predicate
such charge. The record does not disclose any
act of omission or commission on the plaintiff '8
part 'vhich contributed to his injur:'. In such
situation the defense of contributory negligence
is a question of law for the· court and not of fact
for the jury (citing cases). Such being the law,
the fact that contributory negligence was n1entioned in instructions Nos. 1, 2, and 3 given for
plaintiff and omitted in others has no weight. If
contributory negligence was not an issue, the
negativing thereof in some of the plaintiff's in~tructions did not make it an issue; it was rnere
~urplusage. It follo,vs that the failure to negative that defense in instructions Nos. 4, 7, and 8
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was not improper. For the same reason defenjlant 's instructions Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17,
19, 20, 21 and 22 were properly refused."
In appellant's requested instruction No. 2, the trial
court was asked to instruct the jury that under the evi<ience the appellant was not guilty of contributory negligence 1n any way. (Transcript 24, Abstract 40). The
question of contributory negligence was submitted to the
jury in the following instructions: Nos. 7, 8, 10, and 13.
(Transcript 58, 59, 61, 64, Abstract 45-49). The record is
entirely nude of any fact which shows that appellant in
lawfully standing in the street was guilty of a breach
of duty, and there can be no negligence unless some duty
has been violated.
In view of the evidence and of the foregoing authorities, appellant respectfully contends that the trial court
committeed prejudicial error in submitting the unproved
issue of contributory negligence to the jury.
PorNT 3.

The trial court erred in not limiting its instructions
on contributory negligence to that contributory negligence U'hich was alleged in the answer~
Appellant contends not only that the defense of
contributory negligence was not proved, but certain of
the trial court's instructions directed the jury to pass
upon elen1ents of contributory negligence whirh \V"ere not
pleaded by the defendants in their ansvver.
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In their ans\Yer the defendants alleged that the plaintiff acted in a ''negligent, careless, in1prudent and illegal
1nanner in this: that at said time and place the plaintiff
failed to obserYe any lookout for vehicles passing the
point "'"here he \Yas standing and took no precautions
\YhatsoYer to protect himself against being injured in
any n1anner by said Yehicles so passing \vhile the plaintiff \Yas then and there standing in the traveled portion
of the said high"yay." (Transcript 14, Abstract 11, 12) .
..L-\fter stating so1ne abstract propositions, the trial
court, in its instruction No. 7, directed the jury as follo\YS:
''If, therefore, you find fron1 the evidence in
this case that the plaintiff himself failed to use
ordinary care for his ovvn safety at the ti1ne and
plaee complained of and that such failure proximately contributed to the accident and his resulting injuries, then your verdict must be in favor
of the defendants, no cause of action.''
(Transcript 275, Abstract 45, 46).
A cursory reading of the instruction will serve to
demonstrate its generality. It made no mention of the
failure to maintain a look-out or failure to take precautions against being injured by passing vehicles, but
authorized the jury to find any type of negligence.

i~

Instruction No. 10 (Transcript 276, 277, Abstract 47)
even n1ore objectionable:
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''The jury is instructed that if it believes
from the evidence that both the plaintiff and the
defendant were guilty of negligence, and that the
negligence of each directly contributed to the injury of the plaintiff, there can be no recovery
this case, and your verdict will be for the defendants.''

rn

The instruction did not clarify the. issue of contributory negligence for the jury; it merely contained a proposition of law; and the jury must perforce have interpreted
the instruction to 1nean that if the plaintiff was guilty
of negligence of any kind or character, pleaded or unpleaded, and if his negligence contributed to the injury
which he sustained, then the jury Blust find against him.
Instruction No. 13 (Transcript 187, 188, Abstract 48,
49) makes the follo\ving reference to contributory negligence:
'' ... and, if you further find plaintiff was not
negligent in being -w-here he \vas and doing \vhat
he \Vas doing, or such negligence of plaintiff, if
any, did not proximately contribute to his in. . ... ' '
JUries
The only contributory negligence pleaded consisted
of acts of omission-failure to 1naintain look-out and to
take precautions for safety. The instruction authorized
a finding of negligence acts of comn1ission, and the jury
were instructed to disallow recovery if such negligence
was found.
Appellant relies upon the case of I~oehhead v. Jensen,
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42 lTtah 99, 129 Pac. ~l±7, as authority for the proposition
contended for under this point. Quoting from the
opinion:
~ · Xo\Y as to the charge. Notwithstanding the
single act of alleged negligence-running the autolnobile at a high rate of speed-the court nevertheless rharged that if the jury found that the defendant · \Ya~ driYing ~aid car negligently or carelessly, or if you belieYe that he was driving at a
rec kles~ or dangerous rate of speed' and that 'the
death resulted directl~· and proximatel:v· fron1 such
negligence or carelessness, then you should find
for the plaintiffs.· ..:\gain, the court eharged that
if the jury found that 'the defendant -vvas not in
the exereise of reasonable care in the operation
of his said car, and that by reason thereof the
jnjury occurred to the said deceased, and the said
negligence of the said defendant \Vas the direct
and proximate cause of the said injury, 'then the
defendant \Vas liable.' The court also charged
that it \\Tas the duty of the defendant in operating
the automobile 'to use due diligence in the driving
of the same so as to have it under reasonable
control at all times to avoid injury; and it is th~
duty of the driver of said car to keep a reasonable
look-out for an~T obstructions or dangers that 1na.\·
be in the road upon \vhich he is driving, and if he
fails to do so and through his negligence causes
injury to others, then he is liable therefor.' The
court further charged that in determining \vhether
or not defendant '\vas exercising reasonable care'
the jur.\· might consider 'the matter in \vhich the
defendant \\Tas driving' and 'the speed at \vhich he
\vas fb·iving.' It is thus seen that the charge
clearly presented to the jury questions of negligence far beyond that charged in the co1nplaint
and per1nitted thP jury to has~ a Y~rdirt, not onl~T
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upon the negligence alleged but also upon any
negligent or careless operation, management,
control, or driving of the auto1nobile, or failure to
observe or keep a reasonable lookout for obstructions or dangers in the road. That the charge, in
view of the alleged negligence, was erroneous and
prejudicial needs no argument.''
PoiNT

4.

Hat;ing subntitted the isstte of contributory negligence to the jury the court should have given appellant's
requested instruction No. 4, to the effect that app-ella1tt
being shielded by his truck parked parallel to the curb
was under no dtlty to 1naintain a constant look-out and his
failure to n1 aintain a look-out under those circumstances
112ay not be considered as contributory negligence.
(Transcript 26, . A. bstract 40).
~t\.lthough

by urging this point we do not concede
that the court \Vas warranted in submitting the issue of
contributor~;' negligence to the jury, yet, having done so,
it is contended that the trial court erred in failing anil rPfusing to give appellant's requested instruction No. 4;
and in substantiation of this contention, appellant respectfully calls the court's attention to the case of
Fabricus v. \Tieira (Calif.), 233 Pac. 396. In that case
plaintiff parked his car facing north off the paved portion of the highvvay. The left side of the car was between
18 inches and 4 feet fron1 the paved portion. Plaintiff
\vas standing on the left side of the car in the act of fixing
the carburetor \vhen he "Tas strur k by a truck being
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driven in the same direction that plaintiff's car was facing. It "\Vas contended that the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence. Quoting from the decision:
"It appears that there was nothing to have
prevented plaintiff from parking his automobile
at a greater distance from the pavement, and that
he made no effort to observe approaching vehicles
\Yhile he was adjusting the carburetor. Had he
attempted to watch for approaching machines, he
probably could have done little else, because the
evidence \vas there were many automobiles traveling along the pavement in either direction ....
''There is no doubt as to the sufficiency of the
evidence to sho'v that the driver of the truck -vvas
guilty of actionable negligence which vvas the
proximate cause of the injury. It is equally clear
that the evidence does not show, as a matter of
la,v, that the plaintiff vvas guilty of contributory
negligence. These conclusions so clearly appear
from a mere statement of the evidence that further discussion is deemed unnecessary.''
Bearing in mind the fact that the truck behind vvhich
the appellant was standing, in the case at bar, vvas a
panel truck so that it \Vould be impossible for appellant
to see over the top of it to observe the defendants' truck
which came from the opposite direction, and bearing in
mind that the appellant, if he saw the truck approaching,
vvould not be able to anticipate that a wheel -vvould be
thrown at him as it sped by, it is difficult to conceive,
without doing violence to reason and common sense, why
the appellant "\Vould be required to maintain a look-out.
It \\rould be in1possible for anyone to open the back-doors
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ot

a panel truck tb get something out of it to effect a
delivery, if during all the time he was required to in some
m'anner watch for ahd dodge missiles which might be
thrown at him from passing vehicles.

PoiNT 5.
~-

That the defe>ndants u'ould not be liable if the defect

in their equi;pin/ent tvas simply unknown to them was a
mis-statement of the law.
Appellant's 'objections in this r-e·gard are ba:sed principally upon the trial court's ins.truction No. 13 (Transcript 187, 188, Abstract 48, 49).
'' ... you n1ust return a ver·dict in favor of
plaintiff, u~nless you believe that the defect in
defendants' ·equipment, if you find the ·ivheel was
thrown against plaintiff 'because of a defect in the
equipment, was unkno\vn to defendants, or could
not have been discovered by them upon a reasonable .prudent jnspe'etion, 'in which event, if you
helieve either of -these t'\vo ·alternatives you· should
find in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff, no cause of action.''
1

By the instruction two· alternatives \vere ·presented
to 't-he jury and "'they should deny recovery if either .Of
the two alternatives~was found. In·other words the·clear
import of the instruction is: if the defe·ct in ·the ·eqnipln-ent was unknown to ·the defendants, then ~the jury
should find in favor of the defendants, no eause of action:
or, if the defect could not ihav-e hPPn discovered :by the
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defendants through a reasonable, prudent inspection,
then they \Yere not liable.
e respectfully contend that
the rule \Yas i1nproperly stated in the disjunctive in the
forepart of Instruction 13 and the disjunctive vvas einphasized by the court stating the proposition in the
alternatiYe in the latter part of Instruction 13. This vvas
a perpetuation of the Inisleading, disjunctive statement
of the san1e proposition in Instruction 12 (Transcript
186, 187, ~\bstract -±7 ~ -!8).

'T

~-\_ppellant

neYer contended at any ti1ne that the defeet in defendants· equipment \Yas kno\vn to the1n, nor
did appellant atten1pt to prove that the defect vvas kno\vn
to the defendants. In fact the testi1nony of both the
plaintiff and the defendant N eslen was to the effect that
the defendant X eslen \Yas surprised to discover that the
wheel \Yas not on the hand-truck. And yet, the jury were
instructed that if the defect was unknown to the defendants, then they must find in their favor, no cause of
action. Remen1bering that it is the jury's svvorn duty to
follo\v the directions of the trial court, it is difficult to
perceive how it would be possible for the jury under
Instructions 12 and 13 to find for the plaintiff; and the
instructions were tanta1nount to a peremptory charge
that the defendants were not negligent at all.
It is submitted that the rule correctly stated is as
follow's: Although the defect in the equipment is unknovvn
to the defendants, they are nevertheless liable for injuries
eaused by such defect if a reasonable, prudent inspection
\Vould haYe diselosed it.
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Ntunerous illustrations of this proposition are a£-·
forded by the cases. In the derailment of a railroad
train, those operating the train are not absolved fron1
liability simply because they did not kno-vv of the defect
in the track or in the equipruent, vvhich a rea~onable, prudent inspection would have disclosed. Jn the case of Kean
v. Srnith-Reis Piano Co. (:l\fo.), 227 H. W. 1091, the defendant maintained a flagpole over the sidewalk which
fell upon plaintiff. It could not have been contended that
the defendant could absolve itself from liability simply
because it may not have kno\vn that there was a defect in
the pole.
Indeed, appellant has not been able to find a case
in which the rule applied in Instructions 12 and 13 has
been approved.
PoiNT

6.

The trial court usurped the prerogatire of the ,jttry
in assuming as true eridence abottt U)hich there was a
·"·nbsta n t ia l disp1de.

In its Instruction No. 16 (Transcript 280, Abstract
50, ;)1) the trial court told the jtu·:· that the:· had b( Pn
pern1itted to view' the motor truck and the ha1Hl-truek
and dolly.
1

Reference is here 1nade to the State1nent of the Case
g·iven earlie1· in this brief \Yhere it is sh0\\'11 that therr
\Yas a substantial dispute in th(l PYi<len('P as to th<' identjty
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of the \Yheel "Thich struck appellant and the "\vheels which
\Yere on the hand-truck \Yhich the jury had been permitted
to vie\Y and \Yhich \Yas produced in court by the defendant~.

~-\ppellant

contends that the "\Vording of Instruction
Xo. 16 disregards this dispute in the evidence and constituted an interference \\yith the jur~T 's fact-finding prerogative. The jur)T n1ay have construed the instruction
as a discrediting by the court of appellant's testin1ony
and the testilnony of the \Yitness Butter\vorth, and \vas,
therefore, mo~t prejudicial.
The jury sy~ten1 is founded upon the funda1nental
principle that the n1embers of the jury are the exclusive
judges of a disputed fact and the jury system would fail
if the court \Yere allowed to interfere with its fact-finding
prerogative by giving a judicial view of the evidence.
The Court's attention is called to the case of Sullivan
v. ~filler (Ala.), 140 So. 606;
''(~barge

8 \vas also bad and should not ha vr
been given. It assumes that Cook carried the
pistol on the premises of the plaintiff in the effort
to take the property, under the mortgage. While
this may have been the purpose of Cook and it
"\Vas open to the jury to so find under the evidence,
yet the charge assumes it to be a fact, and, for
assuming to be true a disputed fact was faulty.''
See also Lorie v. Lumbermen's l\futual Casualty Co.
(1fo.), 8 S. W. 2d 81.
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The Utah Suprerne Court has passed upon this point
in the case of Nelson v. Lott, 81 Utah 265, 17 Pac. 2cl 272.
In that case the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
"The court instructs the jury that the plaintiff, Nelson,
was, at the time of the injury in this case, in a place where
he had a right to be, etc.'' This Court in condemning the
instruction said:
''One of the 1nost strenuously contested
points in the case \vas whether or not respondent
was standing in the position he claims to have
been in when the collision occurred, or stepped
suddenly into the position where he \vas injured at
the n1oment of the in1pact. Neither of the parties
were trespassers. They \Vere invitees and they
had an equal right to be on the pre1nises. But to
which of them had the right, or the prior or
superior right to be in the particular spot \vhere
the injury occurred at the ti1ne of its occurrence,
\Ve think, in vie\v of the conflict in the evid~..nee,
\vas a question ''Thich the jury should havP been
privileged to detern1ine. We think the in~truetion
was probably calculated to rnislead the jury, P~
pecially when considPr(•rl in conjunction \\·ith instruction No. 8.''

That the trial court shou.ld hare granted appellant's
1notion for a ne1c t1·ial.

By reason of the prejudicial

error~

rounnittecl by tlH·

trial court as hereinabove discussed, \vhich prevente(l
appellant fron1 having a fair trial, it is suh1nitted that
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the District Court should haYe granted a.ppellant 's nlotion for a ne"~ trial.
CO~CLUSIONS

In eoneluding this brief, appellant submits that for
the reasons herein outlined the trial court erred to the
prejudice of the appellant in its instructions to the jury
and in its failure and refusal to give the instructions
\Yhich appellant seasonably requested.
It is further respectfully submitted by appellant
that the trial court, in view of the errors herein assigned
and herein discussed, should have granted appellant's
motion for a new trial; and that the sound and long
established principles of law and justice require that
the judgment of the District Court be reversed and
appellant be granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
WOODROW D. WHITE,
Attorney for Appellant.
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